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Abstract. This paper aims to delineate the class of aesthetic judgments linguistically. 
The main idea is that aesthetic judgments can be specified by a certain set of 
assertibility conditions, i.e., by norms that govern appropriate speech-acts. This idea is 
spelled out in detail and defended against various objections. The suggestion leads to 
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the basis for a non-circular and satisfying characterization of the whole domain of 
aesthetic research and it marks an important linguistic difference between aesthetic 
judgments and judgments of personal taste.  
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1. Introduction 
 
What differentiates aesthetic judgments, aesthetic experiences, and aesthetic 
properties from non-aesthetic judgments, experiences, and properties? It is 
hard to answer one of these questions without already presupposing an answer 
to at least one of the others. Aesthetic judgments, for example, are often 
characterized as judgments that refer to aesthetic properties or as judgments 
triggered by aesthetic experiences. However, the aesthetic literature seems to 
suggest that both of these options quickly run into circularity.  Philosophers on 
all sides of the debate concerning the structure and metaphysics of aesthetic 
properties implicitly or explicitly individuate these properties as the properties 
the predicates of aesthetic judgments refer to, thereby rendering the first 
option uninformativly circular.1  																																																								
1 Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1958), 93; Alan Goldman, ‘Realism about Aesthetic Properties’, The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (1993): 31–37; Derek Matravers, Derek, ‘Aesthetic 
Properties I’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (2005): 191–210; Jerrold Levinson, 
‘Aesthetic Properties II’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (2005): 211–227; John 
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The same seems to be true with respect to the second option. Faced 
with the fact that experiences we would like to count as genuinely aesthetic are 
so diverse with respect to their phenomenal and other intrinsic characteristics, 
many philosophers have turned to an external or content-oriented approach 
regarding those experiences.2 Noel Carroll, who carefully worked out probably 
the most convincing content account of aesthetic experiences writes: “An 
aesthetic experience of an object is an experience that is directed at the form of 
the object, its expressive and aesthetic properties, and the interaction among 
these elements.”3 Note that in specifying the content in question, Carroll refers 
to aesthetic properties. However, if it is correct that aesthetic properties can 
only be specified via recourse to aesthetic judgments, then we are faced with 
the circularity-problem again:  What is an aesthetic judgment? It is a judgment 
accompanied or triggered by an aesthetic experience. What is an aesthetic 
experience? It is an experience of an aesthetic property of an object. What is an 
aesthetic property? It is a property an aesthetic judgment refers to. 
Of course, these short remarks cannot prove conclusively that 
specifying aesthetic judgments via recourse to aesthetic properties or aesthetic 
experiences is doomed to fail. Maybe there is a way to solve these circularity 
problems or maybe the circularity involved in specifying the aesthetic domain 
of research is not as problematic as it appears at first. However, as long as we 
agree that a non-circular specification of a domain of research would be 
preferable, these remarks should suffice to motivate the following question: Is 
there a way to specify aesthetic judgments without recourse to aesthetic 
properties and aesthetic experiences thereby circumventing potential problems 
of circularity from the outset?  
In this paper I want to investigate whether we can give a positive 
answer to this question. More precisely, I will discuss the prospects of a non-
circular linguistic specification of aesthetic judgements on the basis of which 
other aesthetic notions could be specified. The envisaged linguistic 
specifications aims to classify aesthetic judgments via recourse to a certain set 
of assertibility conditions, i.e., via a certain set of norms that govern when an 
utterance is appropriate.  
The specification I am looking for is supposed to meet the following 
conditions of adequacy: (A) non-circularity, in the abovementioned sense; (B) 
impartiality, in the sense that no serious theoretical option with respect to the 
meaning of aesthetic judgments is excluded from the outset; (C) extensional 
adequacy, in the sense that all paradigmatic examples of aesthetic judgments 																																																																																																																																													
Bender,  ‘Aesthetic Realism 2’, in Jerrold Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics 
(Oxford: OUP, 2005), 80–98. 
2 James Shelley, ‘The Concept of the Aesthetic’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), sec. 2.4, URL=<https:// plato.stanford. 
edu/archives/win2017/entries/aesthetic-concept/>; Noel Carroll, ‘Aesthetic Experience 
Revisited’, The British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (2002), 145–168; Noel Carroll, ‘Aesthetic 
Experience: A Question of Content’, in Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in 
Aesthetics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 69–97. 
3 Carroll, ‘Aesthetic Experience’, 98. 
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and all paradigmatic examples of non-aesthetic judgments are classified 
accordingly; (D) theoretical fruitfulness, in the sense that the characterization 
exhibits some kind of benefit with respect to the scientific investigation of 
aesthetic phenomena. 
Two points concerning this list should be noted. First, only extensional 
adequacy is required. The characterization does not aim to specify the essence 
or the nature of aesthetic judgments. The envisaged characterization simply 
aims to extensionally delineate the class of aesthetic judgments. In this sense, 
the suggested characterization of aesthetic judgments should only be 
considered a first step within a substantial theory of aesthetic judgments.4 
Second, exactness in the sense that the characterization has to definitely settle 
controversial or in a certain sense unclear cases is not included in the 
conditions of adequacy. It might be that the class of aesthetic judgments does 
not have sharp boundaries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I will 
introduce the new linguistic specification of aesthetic judgments. In Section 3, 
the suggested specification is clarified by considering various challenges to it. 
Answering these concerns will lead to important modifications and extensions. 
In section 4, remaining objections will be considered and dismissed. Finally, in 
Section 5, I will briefly summarize the discussion and explain in what sense the 
suggested linguistic specification of aesthetic judgments is theoretically fruitful.  
 
 
 
2. Aesthetic statements and the linguistic acquaintance principle 
 
What is an aesthetic judgment? We might answer this question by giving a 
paradigmatic example, such as “X is beautiful.” However, focusing only on 
judgments of beauty seems to restrict the theoretical focus. In a series of 
seminal papers, Frank Sibley highlighted the great variety of judgments that are 
important for an aesthetic theory. 5  Paradigmatic examples of aesthetic 
judgments besides judgments of beauty include:   
 
X is graceful/ elegant/ dynamic/ majestic/ dainty/ unified/ 
balanced/ vibrant/ moving/ somber etc. 
 
However, widening the perspective in this way is accompanied by the need to 
specify the class of aesthetic judgments on the basis of some criteria. In this 
																																																								
4 Eventually, we want a theory concerning the nature of aesthetic judgments, their 
semantics and pragmatics, their variable degree of evaluation, their epistemology, etc. 
However, in order to develop such a substantial theory, we need to extensionally specify 
the object of investigation first. 
5 Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, The Philosophical Review 68 (1959), 421–50; ‘Aesthetic 
and Nonaesthetic’, The Philosophical Review 74 (1965), 135–59.		
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paper I will suggest linguistic features on the basis of which aesthetic 
judgements can be differentiated from non-aesthetic ones. 
However, before I can introduce the linguistic specification of aesthetic 
judgments, some preliminary remarks are in order. The term “judgment” is 
ambiguous between an explicit and sincere statement and the thought or belief 
that could be expressed by such a statement.  For what follows it will be useful 
to disambiguate “aesthetic judgment” and differentiate explicitly between 
aesthetic statements and the mental attitudes (aesthetic thoughts or beliefs) that 
are expressed by such statements.  Furthermore, aesthetic statements (i.e., the 
utterance of certain sentences in a specific context) need to be differentiated 
from aesthetic sentences (i.e, sentences that contain at least one aesthetic term, 
namely an aesthetic adjective or predicate). A linguistic specification of 
aesthetic judgments could either be developed as a specification of aesthetic 
sentences or as a specification of aesthetic statements.  
In my view the chances of giving a satisfying specification of aesthetic 
sentences (or other aesthetic expressions) are rather dim. Louise McNally and 
Isidora Stojanovic  recently suggested a linguistic specification of aesthetic 
adjectives.6 They explicitly acknowledge that given their criteria for aesthetic 
adjectives, many of the terms that aestheticians (either in philosophy or 
psychology) take to be paradigmatic examples of aesthetic terms are not 
classified accordingly. In order to soften that blow, McNally and Stojanovic 
accept that these other and by their lights non-aesthetic adjectives can 
nevertheless be used to make aesthetic statements.7 So even if one follows their 
specification of aesthetic adjectives an important question remains: What 
differentiates aesthetic statements (i.e., the aesthetic use of certain terms) from 
non-aesthetic statements?  
It is also worth noting that the question what differentiates aesthetic 
from non-aesthetic statements becomes even more pressing, if one realizes that 
even a sentence with a paradigmatic aesthetic adjective such as “X is beautiful”, 
can in certain contexts be used to make a non-aesthetic statement.8 Thus, if a 
linguistic specification of aesthetic judgments is supposed to help clarifying the 
domain of investigation of an aesthetic science, it seems to be more promising 
to concentrate on aesthetic statements (utterances) than on aesthetic sentences or 
words. In what follows I will do just that, i.e., I will try to develop a non-circular 
linguistic specification not of aesthetic sentences or terms but of aesthetic 
statements. 
 In doing so I will suggest a certain set of assertibility conditions for 
those statements. The distinction between truth conditions and assertibility 
conditions is widely accepted and put to use in many areas of philosophy and 
linguistics. In contrast to truth conditions, assertibility conditions are norms 																																																								
6 Louise McNally and Isidora Stojanovic, ‘Aesthetic Adjectives’, in J.O. Young (ed.), 
Semantics of Aesthetic Judgments (Oxford: OUP 2017), 17–37. 
7 Ibid., 33–34 
8 Consider, for example: “Bringing flowers to the party was a beautiful gesture.” See Sibley, 
‘Aesthetic Concepts’, 421, for a comparable observation.	
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that govern appropriate speech-acts. Even though a sentence “p” might be true, 
uttering it in a certain context could still be inappropriate, in the sense that it 
flouts an assertibility condition.  
The following acquaintance principle formulates a well-known 
assertibility condition for all statements that are generally considered to be 
paradigmatic examples of aesthetic statements: 
 
(LAP) Linguistic Acquaintance Principle: S’s aesthetic statement “p” is 
appropriate only if S has experienced for herself the object “p” 
refers to. 
 
 (LAP) is very plausible. Take a look at these paradigmatic examples of 
aesthetic statements: “X is beautiful/ elegant/ graceful/ vibrant/ dynamic/ 
majestic.” Suppose in conversation with me you made such a statement and I 
took your word for it, thereby forming the belief that X is very 
beautiful/elegant and so on. Even if we, in contrast to pessimists with respect 
to aesthetic testimony, accept that this belief of mine is justified, it would 
nonetheless be very strange and inappropriate if I were to say to a third party: 
“X is beautiful/elegant/… .” Usually, when we are in such a scenario, we 
weaken the statement in question by prefacing the statement with, “According 
to a friend,” or we say “X is supposed to be beautiful/elegant/… .”9 Thus, at 
least prima facie (LAP) seems very plausible.10 
 The plausibility of the principle can also be highlighted by the oddness 
of the sentences of the following kind: “It’s a wonderful novel; insightful and 
moving, with a beautiful and bewitching language. It’s such a shame that I have 
never read it.”11 Even though this sentence does not constitute a contradiction, 
it is nevertheless massively infelicitous. By recourse to (LAP), the infelicity of 
such a statement can be easily explained: The second half of the sentence 
claims that the conditions for appropriately stating the first part of the 
sentence are not satisfied, and the statement is therefore infelicitous. 
Or consider the following conversations:  
 
(1) A: “The new James Turell installation is beautiful.” 
B: “Yeah? When did you see it?” 
A: “Oh, I haven’t yet.” 
(2) A: “The new Sophia Coppola movie is heart-breaking, thought-
provoking, and elegant.” 																																																								
9 This is even true for art historical texts and the comments therein that are concerned 
with artworks that do not exists anymore. 
10 Note that something along the lines of (LAP) is probably true for all statements that 
involve wh-exclamatives or intensifiers, such as: “What a big crowd that was!“; “His hair is 
sooo long!” What I am claiming is that aesthetic statements meet (LAP) even in the absence 
of these linguistic devices. 
11  Keren Gorodeisky, ‘A New Look at Kant’s View of Aesthetic Testimony’, The British 
Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2010), 53; Jon Robson, ‘Aesthetic Testimony’, Philosophy Compass 7 
(2012), 4.  
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B: “Where did you see it? I thought they closed our theater 
down.” 
A: “Oh, I haven’t seen the movie yet.” 
 
In both cases person B could obviously blame A for making the statements. 
Even though it might be epistemically appropriate for A to believe that the 
installation or the movie is beautiful or elegant, she should not utter the 
corresponding sentence if she did not see the installation or the movie herself.  
Mary Mothersill puts the point as follows: “If someone praises a movie […], 
and it then emerges that he hasn’t actually seen it, we feel not just annoyed but 
as if we’d been lied to.”12 Thus, (LAP) is plausible and widely accepted.13   
The question, why (LAP) holds, is interesting and surprisingly hard to 
answer.14  In the context of this paper, however, the important question is: Can 
we use (LAP) in order to specify aesthetic statements? Consider the following 
suggestion: 
 
Specification(LAP): S’s utterance of “p” is an aesthetic statement if and 
only if the appropriateness of S’s utterance of “p” is conditional on 
S’s having experienced for herself the object “p” refers to. 
 
At first, one might think that this specification is unconvincing for the simple 
reason that (LAP) not only holds for aesthetic statements but for all kinds of 
statements that involve supposedly response-dependent terms like “X is 
yellow,” “X is loud,” and so on. However, this is not true. If my friend is 
trustworthy and she told me that her new bike is yellow, I can felicitously utter 
with respect to a third party: “My friend’s bike is yellow.” I can felicitously 
utter this sentence even though I have not seen the bike for myself. However, 
if she told me that her bike is elegant, I could not appropriately utter the 
corresponding sentence to a third party without having seen the bike for 
myself. 
																																																								
12 Mary Mothershill, Beauty Restored (London: Clarendon Press, 1984), 168. 
13  Note that the principle also plays an important role in the growing literature on 
aesthetic testimony. Pessimists with respect to aesthetic testimony often use (LAP) to 
defend their view. They use the linguistic acquaintance principle (LAP) to argue for an 
epistemic acquaintance principle, which implies that aesthetic testimony is impossible. 
However, all sides of the debate, pessimists and optimists alike, accept the linguistic 
version of the principle (LAP). They only differ over the question whether (LAP) could be 
used to argue for a pessimist view regarding aesthetic testimony. For more examples of 
philosophical debates in which something along the lines of (LAP) is put to use, see Jon 
Robson, ‘Norms of Belief and Norms of Assertion in Aesthetics’, Philosophers’ Imprint 15 
(2015), 1.    
14 For explanations of why (LAP) holds, see: Dilip Ninan, ‘Taste predicates and the 
acquaintance inference’, Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 24 (2014), 290–
309; Alexander Dinges, ‘Relativism, Disagreement and Testimony’, Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly (2017), 1–23; Nils Franzén, ‘Aesthetic Evaluation and First-hand Experience’, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2018), 669–682. 
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Furthermore, specifying aesthetic statements via recourse to (LAP) is 
promising because this specification meets the abovementioned adequacy 
conditions (A) and (B): It is non-circular and impartial. That Specification(LAP) is 
non-circular is easy to see—after all, in Specification(LAP) aesthetic statements 
are not specified via recourse to any other aesthetic notion. Furthermore, 
Specification(LAP) is impartial, it does not rule out serious options with respect 
to the semantics of aesthetic statements. Neither expressivism, contextualism, 
objectivism, or relativism is inconsistent with the truth of Specification(LAP).
15 
The remaining question is whether Specification(LAP) meets adequacy conditions 
(C) and (D) as well: Is specification(LAP) extensionally adequate (see (C)) and is it 
theoretically fruitful (see (D))?  
 
 
 
3. Clarifying and modifying the linguistic specification  
 
In this section I will discuss three important challenges regarding the 
extensional adequacy of Specification(LAP). Before discussing these challenges, 
however, let me make it explicit that I will exclusively focus on singular 
aesthetic statements, such as utterances of sentences like “X is F” or a 
comparable form that refer to single objects. In (LAP) and Specification(LAP), “p” 
stands for singular sentences of this kind. For general aesthetic statements like 
“All Xs are F,” further complications arise that cannot be discussed within this 
paper.  
 
 
3.1. First challenge and modification 
Specification(LAP) differentiates aesthetic statements from other statements by a 
norm of utterance that refers to first-hand experiences of the speaker. How 
should we understand the notion “experience” here? At first, it seems 
reasonable to understand it as perceptual experience. However, should we 
interpret the term as referring to direct or indirect perceptual experiences or 
both?  
To utter appropriately the paradigmatic aesthetic sentence, “X is 
beautiful,” is it really necessary to perceptually experience X directly? That seems 
too strong a requirement. In some cases, it seems fine to utter, “X is beautiful,” 
even though I have not seen X directly but only seen a photograph of X. The 
same seems true with respect to the auditory sense and other sense modalities. 
																																																								
15 For a short and good introduction of these positions, see John MacFarlane, Assessment 
Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 1–21. He introduces the 
main theses of the positions with respect to “X is tasty”. However, the main theses can 
easily be transferred to aesthetic sentences, such as “X is beautiful.” 
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Therefore, we need to construe “experience” here in such a way to allow for 
direct and indirect perceptual experiences alike.16   
However, it is not fully clear what ways of indirectly perceiving an 
object should be allowed. It seems reasonable that a color photograph from 
the correct angle and distance should be allowed in most cases—but what 
about a black-and-white photo or a blurry one? It is hard to give a principled 
and general answer to this question. Building on insights of Robert Hopkins, 
one could try to give a general answer by claiming that all ways of indirectly 
perceiving that let us not only perceive but also enjoy the aesthetic properties 
of the object or that allow us to have the same aesthetic experiences we would 
have by directly perceiving the object should be allowed.17 This answer might 
be true, but it is not helpful within the context of this paper because it refers to 
aesthetic properties and aesthetic experiences, thereby running the risk of 
sliding into a circular characterization. Thus, in specifying how to understand 
the term “experience” in Specification(LAP), we have to content ourselves with 
the somewhat vague and imprecise observation that the term has to cover 
direct and at least some ways of indirect perceptual experiences.   
Unfortunately, there is another complication. It seems reasonable to 
allow that some aesthetic judgments refer to objects that are not experientially 
observable at all. Suppose I have composed a poem or established a 
mathemical proof but have never written it down. In a certain sense it seems 
perfectly fine to make an aesthetic statement about the poem or the proof—
for example, that it is beautiful or elegant—even though I have not perceptually 
experienced the object the statement refers to. Thus, “experience” in 
Specification(LAP) should be understood in such a way that it allows for other 
forms of experience (other forms of acquaintance) besides perceptual experience.  
How should we spell out these other forms of experience or acquaintance in 
detail? Even though this in an interesting question, for the purposes of this 
paper it is not necessary to answer it in detail, and we can content ourselves 
with the somewhat imprecise requirement that “experience” in 
Specification(LAP) needs to cover direct and some forms of indirect perceptual 
experience as well as some forms of non-perceptual experiences. 
Incorporating these issues results in the following suggestion: 
 
Linguistic Specification(LAP)1. S’s utterance of “p” is an aesthetic 
statement if and only if the following conditional holds:  S’s utterance 
of “p” is appropriate only if (i) S perceptually experienced the object 
to which “p” refers in a direct or an apt indirect way, or (ii) in case “p” 
																																																								
16 I am assuming here that a photograph really lets us perceive the depicted object, albeit 
just indirectly,  cf. Kendall Walton, ‘Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic 
Realism’, Nous 18 (1984), 67–72. 
17  Robert Hopkins, ‘Pictures and Beauty’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1997), 
177–194; ‘How to form Aesthetic Belief: Interpreting the Acquaintance Principle’, 
Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 3 (2006), 91–92.  
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refers to an abstract object, S is acquainted with that object in some 
relevant non-perceptual way. 
 
Does the modified Specification(LAP)1 formulate a necessary condition for being 
classified as an aesthetic statement? Even with respect to the modified 
principle, counterexamples can be posed. Suppose you ask me how Sarah is 
doing and I reply: “She is having a great time! She saw a beautiful play by her 
favorite director yesterday.” This statement seems appropriate even though I 
have not seen the play myself. However, in this case, it is natural to assume 
that the play in question was one that Sarah judged to be beautiful (perhaps by 
calling it “beautiful”) and I am tying my statement to Sarah’s judgment. In the 
literature on predicates of personal taste, this is called an exocentric reading of 
the predicate in question.18 These uses contrast with the more usual autocentric 
uses, in which the speaker does not ty her statement to another person’s 
judgment. Thus, in order to sidestep these kind of counterexamples we need to 
restrict Specification(LAP)1 to autocentric uses of sentences. 
Other apparent counterexamples are statements concerning doubles, 
copies, and replicas. Assume my neighbor bought a new car that I have not 
seen yet. However, I know which model and color it is and I have seen other 
cars of this model and color. In this case, experiencing my neighbor’s car for 
myself does not seem to be a necessary condition to felicitously utter: 
 
(1) My neighbor’s new car is beautiful.  
 
Because (1) obviously is an aesthetic statement, Specification(LAP)1 is inadequate. 
It is not necessary for an aesthetic statement to conform to (LAP). 
 Specification(LAP)1 can be defended against this objection in various 
ways. I will mention two. First, one could claim that (1) does not really make 
an aesthetic claim about the concrete car of my neighbor, but rather about a 
certain car model. A car model is a universal (a type) with many instances 
(many tokens), and the concrete car of my neighbor is an instance of such a 
model. If one further claims that to experience or be acquainted with 
universals (types) of a certain sort, like a car model, it is enough to perceive 
one of its instances perceptually, then the abovementioned case does not 
constitute a counterexample. Second, in response to the supposed 
counterexample, one could easily modify Specification(LAP)1 by claiming that 
one either has to experience the object “p” refers to or a (perfect) double of 
this object. 
 The first response to the supposed counterexample is restricted in a 
certain sense; it can only be transferred to supposed counterexamples where 
instances of a universal are involved. The second response, which would lead 
to a modification of Specification(LAP)1, is not restricted in this sense. However, 																																																								
18 Peter Lasersohn, ‘Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste’, 
Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2005), 643–686; Ninan, ‘Taste predicates and the acquaintance 
inference’, 291–292. 
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the clearest cases where we can felicitously utter an aesthetic sentence without 
experiencing the object ourselves involve cases where universals and instances 
of universals are involved. Thus, we can concentrate on the first response and 
stick to the simpler version of Specification(LAP)1, keeping in mind that it could 
be easily modified along the indicated lines of the second response if necessary.  
 
 
3.2. Second challenge and modification 
According to Specification(LAP)1, being governed by a certain utterance norm is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for being an aesthetic statement. In the 
previous subsection we considered whether the linguistic specification really 
formulates a necessary condition for aesthetic statements. In the following 
subsections we will ask whether it formulates a sufficient one. Is it sufficient 
for being correctly classified as an aesthetic statement to be governed by the 
following norm?  
 
S’s utterance of “p” is appropriate only if (i) S perceptually 
experienced the object to which “p” refers in a direct or an apt 
indirect way, or (ii) in case “p” refers to an abstract object, S is 
acquainted with that object in some relevant non-perceptual way (see 
Specification(LAP)1.)
 19 
 
Here are some examples that seem to show that this is not the case: 
 
(2) My arm hurts. 
(3) This apple seems yellow to me. 
(4) I heard the plane crash. 
 
Utterances of sentences (2)–(4), as well as their negations, all seem to be 
governed by the utterance norm formulated in Specification(LAP)1. Thus, 
according to Specification(LAP)1, (2)–(4) would have to be considered aesthetic 
statements. However, utterances of (2)–(4) are pre-theoretically and 
traditionally not considered to be aesthetic statements. Thus, Specification(LAP)1 
does not formulate a sufficient condition for such statements. How can we 
solve this problem? 
(2)–(4) not only refer to objects: my arm, an apple, and a plane but also 
explicitly describe my experiences of these objects. In this sense (2)–(4) are 
explicitly about mental or phenomenal states of potential speakers of these 																																																								
19 The reader might think that it cannot formulate a sufficient condition because by adding 
certain words to a sentence almost every sentence will turn into one that can only be 
uttered appropriately, if the speaker had first-hand experience of the object in question. 
For example, consider wh-exclamatives, declarative exclamatives, or intensifiers, such as:  
“What a big crows that is!”; “Boy, this crowd is big!”; “This crowd is sooo big!” However, 
Specification(LAP)1 should be understood as claiming that aesthetic statements have this feature 
even in the absence of such devices (see fn. 10). 
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sentences. Thus, it is not at all surprising that a speaker can appropriately utter 
(2)–(4) only if she has experienced for herself the objects these sentences refer 
to. Thus, in response to the problem raised by (2)–(4) one could modify 
Specification(LAP)1 by adding a condition excluding the utterance of sentences 
that explicitly describe mental or phenomenal states of the speaker in 
experiencing an object: 
 
Specification(LAP)2: S’s utterance of “p” is an aesthetic statement if and 
only if: 
(a) S’s utterance of “p” is appropriate only if (i) S perceptually 
experienced the object to which “p” refers in a direct or an apt 
indirect way, or (ii) in case “p” refers to an abstract object, S is 
acquainted with that object in some relevant non-perceptual way. 
(b) In uttering “p,” S is not explicitly describing the characteristics of 
the experience that S has while experiencing the object to which 
“p” refers, nor is “p” translatable, without loss, into such a sentence. 
 
By adding (b), utterances of (2)–(4) are excluded from the class of aesthetic 
statements. These sentences either explicitly describe mental or phenomenal 
characteristics of the experience the speaker has while perceiving the object to 
which the sentences refer. Or they can be translated, without loss, into such a 
sentence, i.e., into a sentence that explicitly describes the experience of my arm 
as a painful experience (see (2)), the experience of this apple as having the 
specific phenomenal characteristic of seeming yellow (see (3)), or a specific 
auditory experience of the plane as an experience of the plane crashing.  
However, does (b) exclude too much? Aren’t there at least some 
paradigmatic aesthetic statements that are translatable, without loss, into 
statements explicitly describing characteristics of the experiences potential 
speakers have while experiencing the object to which the statement in question 
refers? Consider the following paradigmatic example of an aesthetic statement: 
 
(5) X is beautiful. 
 
The following sentence (6) is a candidate of a translation of (5) into a sentence 
that explicitly describes the phenomenal or mental characteristics of a potential 
speaker (for simplicity’s sake let us assume that “X” in (5) refers to an object 
that can be perceptually experienced):  
 
(6) In perceiving X, I have a pleasant sensual experience. 
 
In order to check whether (6) can be considered an appropriate translation of 
(5), one has to check whether the two sentences can be substituted for one 
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another in various conversational settings without significant semantic or 
pragmatic effects.20 
It is easy to find cases that illustrate that the sentences in question 
cannot be substituted without significant effects of this kind: 
 
(7) In perceiving Pollock’s One: Number 31 I have a pleasant sensual 
experience, but I am unsure whether Pollock’s One: Number 31 is 
beautiful. 
(8) In perceiving Pollock’s One: Number 31 I have a pleasant sensual 
experience, but I am unsure whether in perceiving Pollock’s One: 
Number 31 I have a pleasant sensual experience. 
 
(8) differs from (7) with respect to the second conjunct: “Pollock’s One: Number 
31 is beautiful” is substituted by “In perceiving Pollock’s One: Number 31 I have 
a pleasant sensual experience.” This substitution goes along with a dramatic 
change: (8) is an instance of a Moorean Paradox such as sentences of the form 
“p, but I do not believe that p,” whereas (7) is not. In contrast to (8), uttering 
(7) is not absurd at all. Thus, in this case the sentences “Pollock’s One: Number 
31 is beautiful” and “In perceiving Pollock’s One: Number 31 I have a pleasant 
sensual experience” cannot be substituted for each other without significant 
semantic or pragmatic effects. 
Another example is concerned with the phenomenon generally (but 
slightly misleadingly) known as the problem of lost disagreement. 
 
(9)  A: Pollock’s One: Number 31 is beautiful. 
B: Pollock’s One: Number 31 is not beautiful. 
(10) A: In perceiving Pollock’s One: Number 31 I have a pleasant 
sensual experience. 
B: In perceiving Pollock’s One: Number 31 I do not have a pleasant 
sensual experience. 
 
Conversations (9) and (10) can both be described as cases of disagreement. 
Note, however, that the kind of disagreement in these two cases is significantly 
different. Only in conversation (9), the disagreement between A and B can be 
highlighted by the use of explicit disagreement markers “No” or “You are 
mistaken.” If we add these markers to the conversations in (9) and (10) we get: 
 
(9*) A: Pollock’s One: Number 31 is beautiful. 
B: No/You are mistaken, Pollock’s One: Number 31 is not 
beautiful. 																																																								
20 Nothing in the following discussion depends on the specifics of the translation I have 
suggested. If the reader is unsatisfied with my suggestion, I invite her to replace my 
suggestion with her favorite candidate of such a translation. As long as the sentence 
explicitly describes certain characteristics of the experience of a potential speaker, the 
following arguments will apply. 
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(10*) A: In perceiving Pollock’s One: Number 31 I do have a pleasant 
sensual experience. 
B: # No/You are mistaken, in experiencing Pollock’s One: 
Number 31 I do not have a pleasant sensual experience. 
 
In (10*) the disagreement markers are obviously inappropriate because in 
uttering, “in experiencing Pollock’s One: Number 31 I do not have a pleasant 
sensual experience,” B obviously does not negate the proposition that A 
expressed in uttering the corresponding sentence. After all, they are speaking 
about different persons.21 In (9*), however, the markers are appropriate. Thus, 
the two sentences cannot be substituted for one another. 
 So even with respect to “X is beautiful”—which is probably the most 
plausible candidate of a paradigmatic aesthetic statement that can be translated 
into a statement that describes characteristics of experiences a speaker has 
while experiencing the object in question—it has been shown that such a 
translation is not without loss. The same is true with respect to other 
paradigmatic aesthetic statements such as “X is elegant/graceful/ somber etc.” 
Thus, by adding (b) to the specification, counterexamples (2)–(4) are excluded 
without thereby excluding paradigmatic examples of aesthetic statements.  
However, is Specification(LAP)2 unsatisfactory in another respect?  Does 
it exclude serious theoretical options with respect to the meaning of aesthetic 
statements right from the start, thereby losing the feature of meeting adequacy 
condition (B) (see section 1)?  The major theoretical options are various forms 
of contextualism (speaker-subjectivism), expressivism, objectivism, and 
relativism. 
 A certain form of Contextualism, namely speaker-subjectivism, claims 
that aesthetic statements have the same semantic content as sentences 
concerning the experiential or mental state of the speaker. Thus, according to 
such an account (5) and (6) are semantically synonymous: 
  
(6) X is beautiful. 
(6) In perceiving X, I have a pleasant sensual experience. 
 
However, faced with the abovementioned data, speaker-subjectivists 
nonetheless accept that in many conversational settings these sentences cannot 
be substituted for each other. In this sense they accept that one cannot 
translate (5) without loss into (6). Can speaker-subjectivists, nonetheless, 
rationally maintain their position? Yes, they can. They could, for example, tell 
some pragmatic story why, despite their semantic synonymy, (5) and (6) cannot 																																																								
21 Note that I am not claiming that B can never appropriately utter the term “No” or 
“You are mistaken” as a response to A. In (10*), B could, for example, appropriately say, 
“No, I cannot believe that,” or, “You are mistaken, the painting is not by Pollock,” 
thereby negating a presupposition of A’s statement. What I am claiming is that B cannot 
appropriately use “No” in combination with the negation of the exact same sentence that 
A used. 
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be substituted for each other in many conversational settings. Or, in order to 
solve the problem of lost disagreement, they could modify their position, 
claiming that “X is beautiful” is not semantically synonymous to “In perceiving 
X I have a pleasant sensual experience” but to “In perceiving X we have a 
pleasant sensual experience,” where “we” refers to the speaker and the hearer 
of the sentence or some other group including the speaker and hearer. Thus, 
specifying the class of aesthetic statements via recourse to (a) and (b), does not 
exclude speaker-subjectivism as a theoretical option with respect to the 
meaning of aesthetic statements right from the start. 
The same is true with respect to all the other major theoretical options, 
namely expressivism, objectivism, and relativism. Proponents of all these 
accounts accept that an aesthetic statement does not explicitly describe the 
experience of a potential speaker nor can it be translated without loss into such 
a sentence. In contrast to speaker-subjectivists, however, they can account for 
this via purely semantic reasons. After all, proponents of all these positions 
deny that sentences such as “X is beautiful/elegant etc.” and sentences about 
experiences of potential speakers are semantically synonymous. If these 
sentences are not synonymous, then it is not surprising that they cannot be 
substituted for each other in various conversational settings.  
In summary, by incorporating (b), Specification(LAP)2 can handle the 
counterexamples (2)–(4) without excluding paradigmatic instances of aesthetic 
statements or serious theoretical options with respect to their meaning. 
 
 
3.3. Third challenge and modification 
Even though Specification(LAP)2 is the most promising suggestion so far, it is 
still confronted with counterexamples:  
 
(12) X is tasty/delicious. 
(13) X is enjoyable/fun. 
 
At least some uses of (12)–(13) seem to meet conditions (a) and (b) of 
Specification(LAP)2: 
 
(a) S’s utterance of “p” is appropriate only if (i) S perceptually 
experienced the object to which “p” refers in a direct or an apt 
indirect way, or (ii) in case “p” refers to an abstract object, S is 
acquainted with that object in some relevant non-perceptual way. 
(b) In uttering “p,” S is not explicitly describing the characteristics of 
the experience that S has while experiencing the object to which 
“p” refers, nor is “p” translatable, without loss, into such a sentence. 
 
However, is it really plausible to consider utterances of (12)–(13) as aesthetic 
statements? An adequate classification of aesthetic statements should cover all 
statements that aestheticians (working in philosophy or psychology) consider 
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to be paradigmatic examples of such statements, and it should exclude all 
statements that aestheticians typically exclude. 
Many aestheticians think that the delight we receive by olfactory, tactile, 
and gustatory experiences are merely sensuous and not genuinely aesthetic. 
Based on this assumption, many aestheticians do not take judgments like 
“Orange juice is delicious” or “Massages are enjoyable” to be aesthetic 
judgments. Even philosophers that oppose this standard view and claim that 
tastes, smells, and tactile experiences can be of aesthetic value are usually 
reluctant to classify utterances of (12)–(13) as aesthetic statements.22 This is 
why in the relevant literature (12)–(13) are often referred to as judgments of 
(personal) taste. 
Nonetheless, by the lights of Specification(LAP)2 utterances of (12)–(13) 
are classified as aesthetic statements, because they arguably meet conditions (a) 
and (b). That they meet condition (a) can be easily illustrated by the oddness of 
the following sentences: “Orange juice is tasty, but I have never tasted it”; 
“Massages are enjoyable, but I have never been given one.” And they seem to 
meet condition (b) as well, because (12)–(13) can hardly be translated without 
loss into sentences, which explicitly describe the experiences that potential 
speakers have while perceiving the objects in question. This can be illustrated 
by the fact that, in contrast to statements explicitly describing experiences of 
potential speakers, people can mark their disagreement with respect to the 
question whether or not something is tasty, enjoyable, or fun by using explicit 
disagreement markers.23 
 
(14) A: Licorice is tasty/ roller coasters are fun/massages are 
enjoyable. 
B: No/you are mistaken, licorice is not tasty/roller coasters are 
not fun/ massages are not enjoyable. 
 
In what follows, I will accept that using these markers in (14) is appropriate 
and that this is enough to prove that (12)–(13) do meet condition (b).  
Thus, if we want to characterize aesthetic statements in a way such that 
(12)–(13) are not included, we have to modify the suggested criterion again. Is 
there a way to linguistically differentiate utterances of (12)–(13) from 
paradigmatic aesthetic statements, i.e. is there an interesting linguistic 
difference between statements of personal taste and aesthetic statements?  
 A possible difference might be found by comparing sufficient conditions 
for appropriately uttering these sentences. Condition (a) in Specification(LAP)2 
only formulates a necessary condition for an appropriate utterance of the 																																																								
22 Such views can be found in: Harold Osbourne, ‘Odours and Appreciation’, The British 
Journal of Aesthetics 17 (1977), 37–48; J.O. Urmson, ‘What makes a Situation Aesthetic’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 31 (1957), 75–106.  
23 Cf. Lasersohn, ‘Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste’; 
Hazel Pearson,  ‘A Judge-Free Semantics for Predicates of Personal Taste.’  Journal of 
Semantics 30 (2013), 643–686. 
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sentences in question. (12) and (13) meet this necessary condition as well as 
paradigmatic aesthetic statements. But maybe we can differentiate (12) and (13) 
from aesthetic statements by formulating a sufficient utterance-condition. 
 The following sufficient utterance-condition seems to be plausible with 
respect to (12) and (13): 
 
(SU) If you have experienced the object to which “p” refers and the 
experience was perceptually pleasing (displeasing) to you, then 
uttering “p” is appropriate.24 
 
If we presuppose that no unusual circumstances prevail (i.e., the speaker has 
not taken any substances that alter her perceptual capacities, she does not have 
a cold, she does not relate very good or very bad memories with the object to 
which “p” refers, etc.), principle (SU) is plausible. This can again be illustrated 
by considering the oddness of certain sentences.  
Take a look at the following examples (again presupposing the absence 
of unusual circumstances of the kind mentioned above): “I love the taste of 
orange juice, but I am unsure whether it is tasty”; “I love the feeling of getting 
a massage, but I am not sure whether it is enjoyable”. These sentences are odd 
because there is a tension between the expressed conviction regarding the 
received pleasure and the unwillingness to make the corresponding 
tasty/enjoyable-judgment. This kind of tension is to be expected if (SU) is 
correct. After all, (SU) claims that in case you have experienced a massage and 
you enjoyed the experience, uttering “Massages are enjoyable” is appropriate. 
 However, with respect to paradigmatic cases of aesthetic statements, 
(SU) does not seem to formulate a correct utterance condition. Thus, via 
recourse to (SU) aesthetic statements and statements such as (12) and (13) can 
be differentiated. Consider statements of beauty and elegance. In order to 
appropriately utter “X is beautiful” or “X is elegant”, it does not seem 
sufficient that you have experienced X and that this experience was pleasing to 
you. This can be illustrated by the fact, that in contrast to the analogous 
tasty/enjoyable-statements the following sentences are not odd at all: “I love 
how this flower looks, but I am unsure whether it is elegant”, “I love how 
Pollock’s One: Number 31 looks, but I am unsure whether it is beautiful”. These 
sentences illustrate that even though the speaker is aware of the fact that she 
definitely had a pleasurable visual experience of a specific flower or a painting, 
the speaker can still be unwilling to make a statement regarding its elegance or 
beauty. Thus, (SU) does not seem to formulate a sufficient condition for 
appropriately uttering “X is beautiful” or “X is elegant”.  
Furthermore, it is not hard to explain why “X is beautiful” and “X is 
elegant” do not meet (SU): These statements do not only have an evaluative but 
also a strong descriptive component. So in order for something to be, for 
example, elegant, it has to have certain descriptive features. Thus, in order to 
appropriately utter “X is elegant” it cannot be enough to have had a 																																																								
24 Cf. Macfarlane, Assessment Sensitivity, 4 
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pleasurable experience of X, at least one also has to believe that X actually has 
some of the relevant descriptive features. Something along those lines seems to 
be true with respect to the more strongly evaluative aesthetic statement “X is 
beautiful” and all other paradigmatic examples of aesthetic statements. 
Thus, we can handle the supposed counterexamples (12) and (13) by 
adding a further condition (c) to Specification(LAP)2, which basically claims that 
(SU) is not a sufficient condition for appropriately uttering the statements in 
question. This leads to the following suggestion:  
 
Specification(LAP)3: S’s utterance of “p” is an aesthetic statement if and 
only if: 
(a) S’s utterance of “p” is appropriate only if (i) S perceptually 
experienced the object to which “p” refers in a direct or an apt 
indirect way, or (ii) in case “p” refers to an abstract object, S is 
acquainted with that object in some relevant non-perceptual 
way. 
(b) In uttering “p”, S is not explicitly describing the characteristics 
of the experience that S has while experiencing the object to 
which “p” refers, nor is “p” translatable, without loss, into such a 
sentence. 
(c) Experiencing the object to which “p” refers and judging the 
experience as pleasurable/displeasurable (i.e., valuing it to a 
certain degree) is not sufficient to appropriately utter “p.” 
 
Admittedly, in its detailed form this specification is rather complicated, the 
basic idea behind it, however, is simple and plausible: Even though aesthetic 
statements are not explicitly about experiences of the speaker (see (b)), they 
can nonetheless only be uttered appropriately if the speaker herself has first-
hand experience of the object the statement refers to (see (a)). However, 
having such first-hand experiences and enjoying or valuing these experiences in 
the specified ways is not sufficient to appropriately utter an aesthetic statement 
(see (c)).  
 
 
4. Remaining worries: good wine and great goals 
 
Before highlighting in which sense I take Specification(LAP)3 to be theoretically 
fruitful, I will consider and dismiss two more potential problems. Take a look 
at the following statements: 
 
(15) X scored a great goal yesterday. 
(16) W is a good wine. 
 
Arguably, both of these statements satisfy the conditions (a)–(c). But should 
we really classify them as aesthetic statements?  
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4.1. First worry: great goals 
I agree that in certain contexts an utterance of (15) does satisfy the conditions 
(a)–(c). Is this a problem for the suggested account of aesthetic statements? I 
don’t think so. In order to see why, note first that the following statements 
obviously satisfy the suggested conditions (a)–(c): 
(17) X scored a beautiful/elegant goal yesterday. 
This is the desired result. After all, we can evaluate all kinds of things 
aesthetically: natural objects, artifacts, artworks, abstract objects, actions, etc. 
So we should also be able to make aesthetic statements concerning certain 
performances in sports.  
The difference between (15) and (18), however, is that (15) does not 
contain a paradigmatic aesthetic term (such as “beautiful” or “elegant”) but a 
purely evaluative term (“great”). It is important to note, that the term “great” is 
highly context-sensitive. Things can be great in all kinds of respects and for all 
kinds of reasons.  
I suggest that whenever the purely evaluative statement (15) satisfies 
the conditions for aesthetic statements (a)–(c), the evaluation of the sportive 
performance has an aesthetic dimension to it:  We judge the performance as 
being great, in the sense that it was executed elegantly and/or beautifully 
and/or dynamically, etc. This is why in certain contexts an utterance of (15) 
satisfies (a)–(c) and is therefore rightfully classified as an aesthetic statement.  
Whenever the evaluation of a sportive performance has no such 
aesthetic dimension to it — for example, when we judge the scoring of a goal 
as being great, in the sense that it was the decisive goal and it was scored in the 
last 10 seconds of the match  — an utterance of (16) does not satisfy (a), and is 
therefore not classified as an aesthetic statement by the lights of the suggested 
Specification(LAP3). That in this case condition (a) is not satisfied (namely, the 
condition that the statement can only be uttered appropriately if the speaker 
herself has first-hand experience of the object the statement refers to) can be 
illustrated by the fact that the following statement is not infelicitous at all: “X 
scored a decisive goal in the last 10 seconds of the match, but I haven’t seen it.”  
 
4.2. Second worry: good wine 
Does the following statement satisfy the conditions (a)–(c) and should we 
classify it as an aesthetic statement? 
 
(16) W is a good wine. 
 
Again, note that the term “good” is highly context-sensitive. Things can be 
good in all kinds of respects. This is even true for “___is a good wine”: a wine 
can be good as an investment, as a gift to your grandmother, etc. Assume that 
context determines that by uttering (16) (and all the following examples) the 
speaker claims that W is good as a wine.  
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Does (16) — when uttered in such a context — satisfy the conditions 
(a)–(c) of aesthetic statements? As far as I can see, all the reasons given above 
as to why paradigmatic aesthetic judgments satisfy (b) and (c) can be easily 
transferred to (16). So by the lights of Specification(LAP)3, whether or not (16) is 
classified as an aesthetic statement depends on whether (16) satisfies condition 
(a) as well: 
 
(a) S’s utterance of “p” is appropriate only if (i) S perceptually 
experienced the object to which “p” refers in a direct or an apt 
indirect way, or (ii) in case “p” refers to an abstract object, S is 
acquainted with that object in some relevant non-perceptual 
way. 
 
Consider an utterance of the following sentence by a salesman in a wine store: 
“W is a good wine, but I have never tasted it.” Is this utterance felicitous or 
not? I am not sure. (The sentence was actually uttered by the salesman in my 
local wine store a few days ago.) We might understand “W is a good wine” as 
highlighting that the wine meets certain standards for good winemaking (i.e., 
standards concerning the products and the various processes involved). 
Whether or not a certain wine meets these standards can be known without 
having had first-hand experience of the wine’s taste, so “W is a good wine, but 
I have never tasted it” at least has some reading according to which it is not 
infelicitous. And if we accept that uttering such a sentence is not infelicitous, 
then (16) does not meet condition (a) and is therefore not classified as an 
aesthetic statement by the lights of Specification(LAP)3. 
However, one might rightly claim that whenever we judge that a certain 
wine is good as a wine, we are not only evaluating the winemaking process but 
also its taste, and this is why “W is a good wine, but I have never tasted it” will 
always sound at least somewhat odd. As far as I can see, it is simply unclear 
whether (16) meets (a), and thereby, it is unclear whether Specification(LAP)3 
classifies (16) as an aesthetic statement or not.  
In my view, however, this does not amount to a serious problem for 
Specification(LAP)3. It was never an aim of the specification-project to begin 
with that we arrive at a level of precision that excludes borderline cases. 
Furthermore, there is an explanation available as to why it is plausible to 
classify (16) as such a borderline case.  
In order to formulate this explanation in detail, we have to consider 
evaluative judgments with respect to artworks first: 
(18) The new painting in our museum is a good artwork.  
Again, assume that context determines that in uttering (18) the speaker judges 
the painting to be good as an artwork. In such a context, the utterance of (18) 
is constrained by (a)–(c) and is therefore classified as an aesthetic statement. 
This is the desired result. After all, aestheticians typically consider statements 
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concerning the value of artworks (as artworks) as paradigm examples of 
aesthetic statements.25  
Let us return to the potentially problematic example: 
 
(16) W is a good wine. 
  
Based on the insight that purely evaluative statements with respect to artworks 
such as (18) are clear cases of aesthetic statements, we can explain why (16) 
constitutes a borderline case. Admittedly, classifying gourmet meals or high-
end wines as works of art is a bit of a stretch. However, it is widely agreed that 
these things are at least in some respects treated in comparable ways: In 
experiencing works of art, high-end wine, and gourmet meals, we embed the 
sensuous experience into a larger cultural context, we aim at distinguishing 
subtle differences in the sensuous experience on various levels, we try to 
identify the different styles of the creators of the objects, etc. If it is correct 
that we treat gourmet meals and high-end wines in a relevantly comparable way 
to the way we treat works of art, and if it is also true that value statements with 
respect to works of art are paradigm cases of aesthetic statements, then it 
should not be surprising that value statements with respect to gourmet meals 
and high-end wines turn out to be borderline cases of aesthetic statements. 
 
 
 
5. Consequences and benefits of the linguistic specification 
 
In the previous sections I have motivated, clarified, and defended an 
interesting specification of aesthetic statements, namely Specification(LAP)3. The 
upshot of the discussion is that Specification(LAP)3 has a good chance to specify 
aesthetic statements satisfactorily: it is non-circular and impartial (see adequacy 
conditions (A) and (B)) and it is extensionally adequate (see adequacy condition 
(C)). The remaining question is: Is Specification(LAP)3 theoretical fruitful as well 
(see adequacy condition (D))? There are several reasons to think that it is. 
First, the suggestion highlights research desiderata for a satisfactory 
theory concerning the meaning of aesthetic statements, namely a detailed 
specification of their semantics, pragmatics, and speech-act theoretic 
classification. Such an account should explain why conditions (a)–(c) hold. 
Formulating a theory that explains all conditions equally well is an interesting 
and challenging task.  
Second, words such as “beautiful” are primarily used to make aesthetic 
statements. However, we can also use those words to make non-aesthetic 
																																																								
25 Of course most aestheticians differentiate between aesthetic and artistic values. I am not 
claiming that this differentiation is unwarranted or useless. I am only claiming that most 
aestheticians would agree that it is correct to classify statements that confer artistic value 
to an artwork as an aesthetic statement. 
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statements.26 Furthermore, words such as “dynamic”, “fragile”, “lifeless”, etc., 
are probably just as often used to make non-aesthetic statements as they are 
used to make aesthetic ones. Even though this is widely acknowledged, the 
linguistic difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic uses of words has 
never been specified. Specification(LAP)3 satisfactorily fills this gap. Words are 
used to make an aesthetic statement if the statement is governed by the 
assertibility conditions (a)–(c). 
Third, condition (c) of Specification(LAP)3 highlights an interesting 
difference between aesthetic statements and statements of personal taste. 
Thereby, also highlighting in which respect the widely discussed semantics and 
pragmatics of the latter cannot be transferred to the former. 
Fourth, in Specification(LAP)3 aesthetic statements are characterized 
without the use of other aesthetic notions. Thus, this specification might be of 
use in specifying those other notions: What is an aesthetic belief? Aesthetic 
beliefs are attitudes that are primarily expressed by aesthetic statements.27 What 
is an aesthetic judgment? An aesthetic judgment is either an aesthetic statement 
or an aesthetic belief.  What is an aesthetic experience? Aesthetic experiences 
are experiences that cause genuine and sincere aesthetic statements or aesthetic 
beliefs. What is an aesthetic property? Aesthetic properties are the properties 
that the predicates of simple aesthetic statements refer to.  
Thus, Specification(LAP)3 does not only meet the conditions of adequacy 
(A)–(C), but condition (D) as well—it  is theoretically fruitful in various ways.  
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